Indianapolis v. Edmond and the Original Understanding of
the Fourth Amendment
By Bruce Newman, Ph.D.

In a recent case, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (991030), the United States Supreme Court held that
Indianapolis’s vehicle check point program violated the
Fourth Amendment by allowing suspicionless searches of
vehicles for criminal evidence.

While acknowledging that

suspicionless searches have been held constitutional in
certain situations, i.e., for the purpose of intercept
illegal aliens (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte1), for the
purpose of operating sobriety checkpoints (Michigan Dept.

of State Police v. Sitz2), and for the purpose of conducting
driver license and vehicle registration checks (Delaware v.

Prouse3), the Court held that suspicionless searches would
not be considered constitutional if the primary purpose of
the search was to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissent. The dissent argues that there should be one
standard for inspection roadblocks.
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And that is the

Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz and Prouse standard.

Chief Justice

Rehnquist argued that the roadblock was constitutional
under the Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse precedents.
According to the Chief Justice, the seizure (of the
automobile during the search) in Edmond was “plainly

constitutional under our jurisprudence: brief,
standardized, discretionless…which effectively serve(s) a
weighty state interest with only minimal intrusion on the
privacy of their occupants.”4

In other words, with barely a

nod (if that) to the Constitution, Rehnquist argues that
the search follows the precedents mentioned above and
therefore is constitutional.

He is not willing to

differentiate between vehicle stops which have criminal
searches as their primarily and therefore will require
individualized suspicion, and stops for other purposes
which will not require individualized suspicion. (the nonlaw enforcement primary purpose test).

Instead, he is

willing to allow all seizures of vehicles during roadblock
inspections as long as the roadblocks meet the above stated
test (brief, standardized, discretionless).
least has the virtue of consistency.
4
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Chief Justice

enforcement purposes subject to suspicionless seizures.
Yet, while this does not violate the Twentieth century
precedent, is this reasoning in keeping with the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment?
Justice Thomas suggests an answer.

Although Justice

Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from the
Court’s decision, he wrote separately.

He states that he

doubts that the Founders would have approved of the seizure
in Edmond, or the seizures in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz or

Prouse for that matter:
Taken together, our decisions in…Sitz
and…Matrinez-Fuerte… stand for the proposition
that suspicionless roadblock seizures are
constitutionally permissible if conducted
according to a plan that limits the discretion of
the officers conducting the stops. I am not
convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were
correctly decided. Indeed, I rather doubt that
the Farmers of the constitution would have
considered “reasonable” a program of
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected
of wrongdoing.5
Thomas is not comfortable with any of the cases in this
line of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

And the reason he

is not comfortable is because doubts that any of the cases
are in keeping with the original understanding of the
amendment.
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He finds it incredulous that the Farmers of the

Justice Thomas dissenting.

Fourth Amendment would have approved of indiscriminate
stops of individuals.

He states, however, that in this

case he will vote with the dissent because the
constitutionally of Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte was not argued
or briefed and because the dissent’s reasoning follows the
precedent:
Respondents did not, however, advocate the
Overruling of Sitz and Matrinez-Fuerte, and I am
reluctant to consider such a step without the
benefit of briefing and argument. For the
reasons given by the Chief justice, I believe
that those cases compel upholding the program at
issue here. I, therefore, join his opinion.6

Justice Thomas’s opinion raises, yet does not attempt to
answer, an interesting question: would the Founders have
opposed stops seizures on public roadways?

In this paper I

examine the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment
to attempt an answer to this question.
things.

I conclude two

First, the Founders were much more concerned with

searches of real property, often insisting, not only on
suspicion, but also a on warrant when searches of real
property are involved.

Secondly, while the Founders did

not consider warrants necessary for searches and seizures
off of real property (which for the sake of simplicity I
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call searches in public areas) the evidence suggests
suspicion was required.

Indeed, the Fourth Amendment was a

direct response to the British general warrant, which did
not require particularized individual suspicion.

This in

turn suggests that Justice Thomas is right; the
suspicionless searches in Sitz, Prouse and their prodigy
are not in keeping with the original understanding of the
Fourth Amendment.

The Colonists and Writs of Assistance

In 1696, the British Parliament passed a law allowing
for the use of writs of assistance in the colonies. The
writ was a form of a general warrant.

Probable cause that

the items searched for would be found in a particular place
was not required.

Under such a writ, officials could enter

any place, including a house or place of business, and
search for and seize prohibited goods.

As Nelson Lasson

puts it, “The writ empowered the officer and his deputies
and servants to search at their will, wherever they
suspected uncustomed goods to be, and to break open any
receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye.”7
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The particular, or specific warrants, on the other hand, of
course require particularized probable cause.

The

government official must go before a neutral magistrate and
demonstrate to him that he has probable cause to find the
goods he is looking for at the particular place he
described.
cause.

Then the judge decides if there is probable

If the officer has not demonstrated probable cause

to search a particular place the judge is not supposed to
issue the warrant.

The warrant gives the added protection

of having a magistrate decide the legitimacy of every
search.
The writs of assistance were most often used in the
colonies of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and were used
frequently to enforce revenue and custom laws.8

A

pernicious aspect of these writs of assistance is that they
were not returnable after execution.

Once issued they were

good for the life of the sovereign -- in fact, life and six
months, not expiring until six months after the sovereign’s
death.

Therefore, the power granted the official was

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 54.
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Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional
Interpretation (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press,
1969), 35.

almost unlimited.

For the life of the sovereign the writs

allowed the official to search wherever he suspected
illegal goods were stored.9
James Otis first aroused the colonists against the
writs of assistance.

And, if John Adams’s report is to be

believed, it was he who immediately gave birth to the
movement for American independence.

In 1760, King George

II died, and in 1761 the writs of assistance expired.
Sixty-three Boston merchants requested a hearing before the
Superior court of Massachusetts on the question of renewing
the writs.

Arguing for the merchants and against the

writs, Otis claimed that they were "instruments of slavery
on the one hand, and villainy on the other," and that the
writ was "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental
principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an
English law book."10

Writs threatened liberty, he argued,

because they violated the privileges of the home:
. . . One of the most essential branches of
English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A
man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet
he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.
This writ, if it should be declared legal, would
totally annihilate this privilege. Custom house
9
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officers may enter our houses when they please -we are commanded to permit their entry -- their
menial servants may enter -- may break locks,
bars and every thing in their way -- and whether
they break through malice or revenge, no man, no
court can inquire -- bare suspicion without oath
is sufficient.11

Otis's main objection was that writs of assistance
transgress upon the right of an English subject to be left
alone in his house as long as he is not injuring anyone
else.

The home is the individual’s castle, his realm;

government officials should not enter while he is peaceful.
To allow government officials to enter whenever they
pleased would destroy the liberty man enjoys in his home.
It would no longer be his castle.
Otis's argument is expanded in "The Rights of the
Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of
Rights," a pamphlet issued by the town of Boston in 1772,
and largely written by Samuel Adams.12

Adams proclaims

that the American colonists are endowed with natural
rights, the most important of these being the rights to
life, liberty, and property:
Among the Natural Rights of the colonists are
these First. a Right to Life: Secondly to
liberty; thirdly to Property; together with the
Right to support and defend them in the best
11Id.

190.
Id., 199.
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manner they can13

According to Adams, the colonists possess rights not
because they are Englishmen, but because they are human
beings. These rights are not gifts of the government, but
of God:
It is the greatest absurdity to suppose it in the
power of one or any number of men at entering
into society, to renounce their essential natural
rights, or the means of preserving those rights
when the great end of civil government from the
very nature of its institution is for the
support, protection and defense of those very
rights: the principal of which as is before
observed, are life, liberty and property. If men
through fear, fraud or mistake, should in terms
renounce and give up any essential natural right,
the eternal law of reason and the great end of
society, would absolutely vacate such
renunciation; the right to freedom being the gift
of God almighty, it is not in the power of Man to
alienate this gift, and voluntarily become a
slave.14

To paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, we are
endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights,
rights that are true and eternal.

The British government

owed the colonists the protection of their rights.
Instead, they abused these rights.

They abused these

natural rights through, among other things, these general
warrants known as writs of assistance:

13Id.

200.
Id., 202

14

These Officers (revenue officers of the crown)
are by their Commission invested with powers . .
. to enter and go on board any Ship, Harbor,
Creek or Haven, within limits of their
commission; and also in the day time to go into
any house, shop cellar, or any other place where
any goods wares or merchandises lie concealed, or
are suspected to lie concealed, whereof the
customs & other duties, have not been, or shall
not be duly paid . . . and the said house, shop,
warehouse, cellar, and other place to search and
survey, and all and every the boxes, trunks,
chests and packs then and there found to break
open.15

Again, we see the concern that general warrants allow
government to search indiscriminately.

In this passage,

Adams, unlike Otis, does not limit his complaint to
invasion of the home, but argues that all property,
including shops, warehouses and houses, should be protected
against general warrants.

Indeed, Adams also complains of

indiscriminate searches vehicles of transportation, in this
case ships.

In particular interest to the situation that

is the basis of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the general warrant
treated the guilty and the innocent alike.

The general

warrant assumed that one's life, liberty and property were
gifts of the state, not natural rights.

What the state

gave, the state could take away.
The point can be further developed by turning to James
15
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Wilson, one of the most important and influential political
thinkers of late eighteenth century America.

In his

"Lectures on Law,” Wilson explores Edmund Burke’s
understanding of the difference between civil and natural
liberty.

Burke argues that man can’t completely enjoy

natural and civil rights together.

When man enters civil

society he gives up his natural rights.16

Wilson contends

that the implication of this view is that under government
people surrender their natural rights in return for "civil
privileges."17 A citizen's rights are seen as gifts of the
government rather than gifts of God.

If this view is

correct, Wilson says, then "man is not only made for, but
made by the government: he is nothing but what the society
frames, he can claim nothing but what the society
provides."18

The purpose of good government, however,

according to Wilson, is not the abridgment of natural
rights, but rather the nourishment and protection of those
natural rights, for “man's natural liberty, instead of
being abridged, may be increased and secured in a
government, which is good and wise.

16
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to his natural liberty, so it is with regard to his other
natural rights.”19
Since government is made for man, and not man for
government, it is the duty of government to serve man.
that means protecting his natural rights.

And

Rights are not

something to use as barter – the government protects us in
return for the surrender of some of our rights.

Rather,

good government protects and nourishes those rights.
The Founders wanted a government that protected and
nourished natural rights, the rights -- in the words of the
Declaration of Independence -- of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.

A good and wise government protects

these rights, and since the British government did not do
so, it was not a good and wise government.

The concern

that people such as Samuel Adams and James Otis had over
the

indiscriminate

assistance

was

that

liberty and property.

19
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The Early State Constitutions
Eight of the early states had bills of rights,20 and
all of these protected against general warrants.21

Four

of the state bills of rights (those of Pennsylvania,
Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts) also contained
statements against unreasonable searches and seizures; but
the wording was such, as Nelson Lasson points out, that it
is clear that the unreasonable search or seizure thus
targeted is the one conducted by a general warrant.22

20
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By early states I mean the original thirteen and
Vermont. Vermont adopted a declaration of rights in 1777
that included a declaration against general warrants
(Section 11). See Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A
Documentary History, 1:323; and Lasson, 82.
21
Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of
the Bill of Rights. (Madison, WI: Madison House, 1992),
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seven states. Both forget Delaware, which passed a
declaration of rights in 1776. Section 17 of that document
condemns general warrants. See Schwartz, The Bill of
Rights: A Documentary History, 1:278.
22
81, n.10. For example, the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights of 1780 (Part 1, Article 14), which is very close
to the wording of the Fourth Amendment (see Landynski, 38
and Lasson, 82), states that "Every subject has a right to
be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the
warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to

first constitutional guarantee against general warrants was
found in Section 10 of the June 12, 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or
messenger may be commanded to search suspected
places without evidence of a fact committed, or
to seize any person or persons not named, or
whose offence is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and
oppressive, and ought not to be granted.23
This Declaration of Rights, which is typical of the other
state constitution’s statements on search and seizure,
condemns general warrants because they allow a person's
property or person to be invaded without the support of
evidence.

They in effect allow anyone's property or person

to be searched and seized.

These warrants are

indiscriminate, and as such they infringe upon a person’s
natural right to liberty and property.

It is also

important to note that the complaint in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights is directed against general warrants.
All searches, even warrantless searches under some
circumstances, are not condemned.

It is the indiscriminate

searches under the authority, and hence protection, of
general warrants that are prohibited.

seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases,
and with formalities, prescribed by the laws." Kurland and
Lerner 5:237. Emphasis added.
23
Kurland and Lerner, 5:237.

Search and Seizure and the Ratification of the Constitution

General warrants were also an issue in the debate over
the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.

Many of the

opponents of the original Constitution were concerned that
it

lacked

a

bill

Antifederalist

of

essay

rights.

Samuel

"Centinel

I,"

Bryan,

argued

in

the

that

the

Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention would decide the fate of
the liberties of Pennsylvanians.

Ratifying the proposed

new Constitution would be a mistake, he claimed, because it
would set up a permanent aristocracy and did not protect
the

liberties

of

the

Constitution

one

searches

seizures,

and

citizens.

was

Under

protected
but

under

the

against
the

Pennsylvania
unreasonable

Constitution

one's

house would no longer be one's castle, and one's person and
property would not be held free from general warrants.24
The

"Letter

#4

from

a

Federal

Farmer,”

argued

that

a

federal bill of rights was needed to protect, among other
essential rights, the "freedom from hasty and unreasonable
search

24

warrants,

warrants

not

founded

on

oath,

and

not

[Samuel Bryan] "Centinel" I, in Debates on the
Constitution ed. by Bernard Bailyn. (New York: The Library
of America, 1993), 1:52-53.

issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men's
papers,

property,

persons."25

and

At

the

Pennsylvania

Ratifying Convention Robert Whitehill proposed a series of
amendments

to

the

federal

Constitution.

Among

those

amendments was one that stated that "warrants unsupported
by evidence . . . are grievous and oppressive, and shall
not be granted either by the magistrates of the federal
government or others."26
and

North

urging
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that

a

Constitution,
prohibitions
generation
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bill
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all
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general
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to

of

the

federal

rights

warrants.27
warrants

resolutions

The

contain
Founding

breaches

of

the

natural rights of man, and wanted to make sure that the new
federal government did not make use of them.
While all the men cited above were Antifederalists, I
do not mean to imply that only the Antifederalists were
worried

about

general

warrants.

The

supporters

of

the

Constitution did not complain of a lack of a specific
prohibition against general warrants because they favored
these warrants. Rather, they thought a bill of rights was
25

"Letters from the Federal Farmer, #4" in Debates,

1:279.
26
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Federalist

was

a

people's

bill

Paper

of

natural

to

paraphrase

84,

that

the

rights,

and

as

such

rights

through

the

mechanisms of separation of powers, checks and balances,
and

the

federal

system

with

its

explicit

authority to the national government.

delegation

of

A bill of rights was

a mere “parchment barrier,” worth only the paper it was
written on, and the inclusion of a bill of rights in the
constitution might suggest that the rights listed were the
only rights the people had, and so imply that the federal
government had more power than it really should.

The Fourth Amendment

Nevertheless, soon after the first Congress convened
in 1789, Congressman James Madison introduced his proposed
amendments to the Constitution -- amendments that would
create a federal bill of rights.

One proposed amendment

stated that:
The rights of the people to be secured in their
persons; their houses, their papers, and their
other property, from all unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants
issued without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, or not particularly describing

the places to be searched,
things to be seized.28

or

the

persons

Madison's proposed amendment is one flowing statement.

or
It

simply says that the rights of the people to be secure in
their persons and homes shall not be violated by warrants
issued without cause, i.e., general warrants.

It is quite

clear that general warrants are the mischief being aimed at
here.

The

final

version29

splits

the

amendment

into

two

clauses30 -- the reasonableness clause, which states that
all searches must be reasonable, and the warrant clause,
which delineates the procedures a government official must
follow in obtaining a proper warrant.
clauses

related?

colonists’
28

I

complaints

have
were

already

How are the two

indicated

directed

towards

that

the

general

Robert A. Goldwin, "Congressman Madison Proposes
Amendments to the Constitution," The Framers and
Fundamental Rights, ed. Robert A. Licht (Washington, DC:
AEI Press, 1991), 78.
29
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
30
Lasson, 100-103, explains how this happened.
Congressman Benson, who was chairman of the committee
appointed to arrange the amendments, made a motion on the
House floor that the words "by warrants issuing" be
stricken and replaced with the phrase "and no warrants
shall issue." The House voted down this proposed change,
but in committee afterwards Benson apparently substituted
his own words for the House approved version. It is
Benson's version that was later approved by the Senate and
ratified by the states and is the Fourth Amendment of
today.
I can find no explanation from Benson or a
contemporary for this change in the wording. Also see
Kurland and Lerner, 5:237.

warrants, not warrantless searches.
that

all

searches

searches
violated

were
the

wrong,
natural

Their argument was not

but

that

rights

indiscriminate

to

liberty

and

property, if not life, by assuming that the state could
search and seize at will.
The Fourth Amendment was aimed not at limiting all
warrantless searches, but rather indiscriminate ones. The
Founders

stipulate

that

government

officials

must

appear

before a judge and demonstrate probable cause to search
before

invading

someone’s

property,

but

they

did

not

condemn warrantless searches in public areas, of property
and persons, as long as there was cause.

Indeed, many

warrantless searches took place at the time of the Founding
and for many years thereafter.31

This is especially true

for searches incident to arrest.32

Federal Search and Seizure Case Law
The Fourth Amendment case law at the federal level is
sparse prior to the Twentieth Century.

Congress passed a

few statutes dealing with searches and seizures, usually -but not exclusively -- in customs cases; but very few of
the laws (many of which I will discuss later) were

31

See pp.50-60 below for some typical examples. Also,
there were many federal cases involving customs laws. See
Harris, 30-34.
32
Taylor, 45.

challenged in the Supreme Court.
limited criminal jurisdiction.

Congress exercised
Crime was considered a

local matter to be handled by the states as part of their
police power.33

Only one Fourth Amendment case, Ex Parte

Burford involved an improperly issued warrant.34
Of the Fourth Amendment cases the Supreme Court did
hear, Locke v. United States35 deserves comment.
important

because

here

John

Marshall

gives

Locke is

his

famous

definition of probable cause. He states,
that the term 'probable cause,' according to its
usual acceptation, means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of
seizure, has a fixed and a well-known meaning.
It imports a seizure made under circumstances
that warrant suspicion.
In this, its legal
sense, the court must understand the term to have
been used by Congress.36
Probable cause does not require enough evidence to convict,
but simply enough to provide reasonable suspicion.

In

fact, the terms probable and reasonable cause at the time
of the Founding “meant ‘probable cause to suspect.’”37

The

clear implication is that the government cannot search and
33

Lasson, 106.
3 Cranch, 448, 1806.
35
7 Cranch, 339, 1813.
36
Id., 367.
34

37

Harris, 34; quoting Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170,
176 (1804).

seize at its own fancy; there must be some suspicion to
search and seize.

State Case Law

Because of the paucity of search and seizure cases at
the federal level in the early days of the republic, it is
important to turn to state cases to understand the beliefs
of early Americans on the issue of search and seizure.
One of the most important cases involves a seizure.

In

Wakely v. Hart,38 a case brought before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Wakely appealed his arrest and subsequent
conviction on the charge of larceny.

He had been arrested

without a warrant and taken to jail where the stolen item,
a watch, was found on his person.39

Wakely contested his

arrest because it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s
warrant requirement, and he sued for trespass and assault
and battery. The court rejected his appeal and ruled for
the defendant, Hart.

In delivering the opinion of the

court Chief Justice Tilghman said that the Pennsylvania

38

6 Binnery 316 [PA 1814].

39

Wakely, 316.

Constitution’s warrant clause is aimed at general warrants
and nowhere prohibits an arrest without a warrant:
The provisions of this section (Pa. Con. art. 9,
sec.7), so far as concerns warrants, only guard
against their abuse by issuing them without
cause, or in so general and vague a form, as may
put it in the power of the officers who execute
them to harass innocent persons under pretence of
suspicion: for if general warrants are allowed,
it must be left to the discretion of the officer,
on what persons or things they are to be
executed. But it is nowhere said, that there
shall be no arrest without warrant. To have said
so would have endangered the safety of society.40

The warrant clause in question, then, according to
Tilghman, is not an endorsement of warrants, but a
limitation on them.

To argue otherwise, by insisting that

all arrests must be made with a warrant, endangers rather
than protects the innocent.
when the guilty go free.

All of society is endangered

The felon who is caught red-

handed, who is seen committing a crime, may be arrested and
searched without a warrant.

He must be arrested on the

spot or he may escape – and possibly commit another crime.

40

Wakely, 318; emphasis added.

41

Wakely, 318-319. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, it was at his peril because if the search did not
turn up evidence, the person conducting the search could be
sued for damages.

Tilghman further argues that if a person is not seen, but
is known by other means to have committed a felony, the
person may be pursued with or without a warrant.

Even a

private person may arrest, at his peril, a felon on
probable cause of suspicion, with or without a warrant.41
The criminal suspect must be convicted, or the seizure is
not justified and the private individual is liable for
damages even if he had probable cause for the seizure.

The

officer, on the other hand, is justified by probable
cause.42

42

These above-stated points are principles of common

Wakely does not mention officer justification, but
obviously that is what the court means, for why else
specify justification for private individuals only?
For
officer justification see Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. 281,
284-285 (1850); Reuck v. McGregor, 32 NJL 70, 74 (1866);
Johnson v. State, 30 GA 426, 430 (1860).
The Georgia
court in Johnson quotes no less than the famed English
common law commentator Matthew Hale to back up its argument
for officer justification for a warrantless arrest based on
probable cause:
“by virtue of his office, empowered by law, to
arrest felons, or those that are suspected of
felony, and that before conviction and also
before indictment. And these are under greater
protection of the law, in execution of this part
of their office, upon these two accounts:
“1. Because they are persons more eminently
trusted by the law, as in many other incidents to
their office, so in this.

law, Tilghman says, and were not meant to be changed by the
warrant clause of the constitution:
The whole section (Pa. Con. Art. 9, sec. 7)
indeed, was nothing more than an affirmance of
the common law, for general warrants have been
decided to be illegal; but as the practice of
issuing them had been ancient, the abuses great
and the decisions against them only of modern
date, agitation occasioned by the discussion of
this important question had scarcely subsided,
and it was thought prudent to enter a solemn veto
against this powerful engine of despotism.43
On the other hand, Tilghman clearly states that the
purpose
searches

of

the

and

harassment

of

suspicion.”

amendment

seizures.

The

“innocent
General

is

to

prevent

purpose

persons

warrants

is

under

indiscriminate
to

the

infuriated

prevent
pretence
the

Founding

generation

was

so

concerned

of

Founders

because they allowed such indiscriminate searches.
the

the

about

Indeed,
these

general warrants that they enumerated in the federal and
many

state

constitutions

prohibitions

against

these

"engines of despotism."

Congressional Search and Seizure Statutes

Another way of establishing the original understanding
“2. Because they are, by law, punishable, if they
neglect their duty in it.“…these officers, that
are thus entrusted, may without any other warrant
but from themselves, arrest felons and those that
are probably suspected of felonies;…”
2 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 85, 86 and 1 East P. C. 301;
quoted in Johnson v. State, 430-431.
43
Wakely, 319, emphasis in original.

of the Fourth Amendment is to look at the laws the early
Congresses passed concerning search and seizure.

Most of

these laws, like the ones involved in Sailly and Jones,
concerned customs.

The same Congress that proposed what

eventually became the Fourth Amendment passed three customs
acts that bear on our question.

The first, The Collections

Act of 1789, empowers federal officers to search for goods
imported into the United States without duty:
. . . every collector naval officer and surveyor,
. . . shall have full power and authority, to
enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall
have reason to suspect any goods, wares or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed;
and therein to search for, seize, and secure any
such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they
shall
have
cause
to
suspect
a
concealment
thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store,
building, or other place, they . . . upon
application on oath or affirmation to any justice
of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter
such house, store, or other place (in the day
time only) and there to search for such goods,
and if any shall be found, to seize and secure
the same for trial; . . . . 44
The officers can search ships and vessels without a warrant
if they have “reason to suspect” such a ship or vessel
contains

contraband

goods.

The

authors

of

this

consider such a warrantless search reasonable.

act

However,

even here the officers must have reasonable suspicion to
search.

They

cannot

just

search

a

ship

or

vessel

arbitrarily.

Notice, when it comes to homes, stores or

any

buildings

particular
44

the

officer

must

Collections Act, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).

go

before

a

justice
secure

of
a

the

peace,

warrant.

obviously

did

not

searches;

but

also

give

The

oath

or

of

this

members

consider
they

an

a

warrant

believed

that

affirmation
First

Congress

necessary
private

and

for

all

buildings

were entitled to extra protection from government searches.
To search these private buildings a warrant was needed.45
As

James

Etienne

Viator

has

pointed

out,

the

Collection Act became law less than a month before Madison
proposed

his

search

and

seizure

amendment

to

the

U.

S.

Constitution. The same Congress that proposed the Fourth
Amendment passed more than one act that allowed warrantless
searches outside of buildings, but required a warrant to
search buildings:
Hence, because the same legislators were busy
working on both proposals, it is not unreasonable
to assume that the sorts of searches detailed in
the Collection Act provide persuasive evidence of
45

The importance of the First Congress can not be overemphasized. Its decisions have long been given special
importance because it came into session a mere two years
after the Constitutional Convention, because many of its
members were delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
and because it set the precedents for future Congresses.
Indeed the Supreme Court has said, “early congressional
enactments ‘provide ‘contemporaneous and weighty evidence’
of the Constitution’s meaning.’
Such ‘contemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution . . .. ,
acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the
construction to be given its provisions.’” Printz v. United
States (117 S. Ct. 2367, 1997) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 723-724 (1986) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 790 (1983), and Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52, 175 (1926)).
46
James Etienne Viator, “The Fourth Amendment in the
Nineteenth Century,” in Hickok, 175.

what
search
and
seizure
techniques
were
considered to be reasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment."46
Viator nicely explains the distinction between searches of
buildings and other searches found in the Collection Act of
1789:

...the Collection Act of 1789, therefore, should
be enough in and of itself to refute anyone who
argues
that,
at
least
by
the
original
understanding, the reasonableness clause of the
Fourth Amendment should be read in tandem with
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to
declare
that
the
only
reasonable
searches
countenanced
by
the
Fourth
Amendment's
congressional enactors were those proceeded under
a warrant . . . the Collection Act paid homage to
the traditional English axiom that "a man's home
is his castle" by providing that any search of a
building -- and, notice, not just a house but a
store or other building -- was to proceed under a
warrant
given
on
oath
or
affirmation
and
particularly
describing
the
location
to
be
47
searched.
The passage of the Collection Act by the First Congress
argues against the position of Landynski and others that
the Fourth Amendment allows only searches conducted by a
warrant.

As Viator correctly emphasizes, the Collection

Act did not give special protection to homes, but provided
protection to all privately owned buildings.48
The second act I want to consider is An Act Further to
Provide for the Collection of Duties (3 Stat. 231, 1815).

47

Ibid.
Also see Harris, 29; Lasson, 125-126.

48

This

act

is

similar

to

the

first

act

described.

It

requires a search warrant to search any house, store or
other

building

for

goods

unlawfully

imported

into

the

United States. It provides for warrantless searches outside
of buildings:
. . . it shall be lawful for any collector, naval
officer, surveyor, or inspector of the customs .
. . to stop, search, and examine any carriage or
vehicle, of any kind whatsoever, and to stop any
person traveling on foot, or beast of burden, on
which he shall suspect there be any goods, wares,
or merchandise, which are subject to duty, or
which shall have been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law; and if such
officer find any goods, wares, or merchandise, on
any such carriage, vehicle, person travelling on
foot, or beast of burden, which he shall have
probable cause to believe are subject to duty, or
shall have been unlawfully introduced into the
United States, he shall seize and secure the same
for trial.49
In

this

statute

the

customs

officer

is

only

allowed

to

seize items if there is probable cause to suspect that the
items have been illegally imported into the United States.
Nevertheless,

when

it

comes

to

buildings

a

warrant

is

required for a search:
. . . if any of the said officers of the customs
shall suspect that any goods . . . which are
subject to duty, . . . are concealed in any
particular
dwelling
house,
store,
or
other
building, he shall, upon proper application, on
oath, to any judge or justice of the peace, be
entitled to a warrant, directed to such officer,
who is hereby authorized to serve same, to enter
such house, store, or other building, in day time
49

An Act Further to Provide for the Collection of
Duties, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1815).

only, and here to search and examine whether
there are any goods, . . . which are subject to
duty. . . . 50

Again,

we

homes

see

and

statute.

a

double

stores,

standard.

receive

extra

Buildings,
protection

including
under

the

And it is not only homes, but also places of

business, stores, that receive the extra protection of a
warrant requirement.
Following this clause requiring a warrant to search a
Building, Congress reiterates that a warrant is not to be
required to search in vehicles or public areas:

Provided always, That the necessity of a search
warrant, arising under this act, shall in no case
be considered as applicable to any carriage,
wagon, cart sleigh, vessel, boat, or other
vehicle,
of
whatever
form
or
construction,
employed as a medium of transportation, or to
packages on any animal or animals, or carried by
man on foot.51
Congress

feels

so

strongly

about

the

right

to

search

vehicles and persons on foot without a warrant that it adds
a

clause

to

this

section

of

the

statute

specifically

stating that although all searches in buildings are to be
conducted by warrants, this should not be interpreted to
mean that warrants are required for searches in vehicles or
public areas.

There could be no clearer evidence that the

early Americans did not believe that the Fourth Amendment
set out an absolute warrant requirement.
50

Ibid.
Ibid., emphasis in original.

51

The Fourth

Amendment obviously was not meant by the early generations
to require a warrant in all situations.52

Conclusion

Indianapolis

v.

Edmond

decision

illustrates

troubling propensity of the twentieth-century Court.

a
The

Court jealously guards (sometimes to the point of creating
new rights) the protections available to criminal suspects;
while at the same time is indifferent to the violations of
the constitutional rights of law-abiding citizens.

52

This

For further example of acts that differentiate
between searches on one’s premises and outside of those
premises, see An Act to Provide more Effectually for the
Collection of Merchandise Imported into the United States
and of the Duties Imposed by Law on Goods, Wares and on
Tonnage of Ships or Vessels (1 Stat. 145, sections 48 and
51) and Duty Collection Act (1 Stat. 627, sections 66-70).
Cf. An Act to Reduce Internal Taxation and to Amend an Act
Entitled An Act to Provide Internal Revenue to Support the
Government, to Pay Interest on the Public Debt and for
other Purposes(14 Stat. 98, section 15; which requires a
revenue officer to obtain a search warrant before searching
premises that are being used to commit fraud on the United
States) with An Act for Enrolling and Licensing Ships or
Vessels to be Employed in the Coasting Trade, and
Fisheries, and for Regulating the Same (1 Stat. 305,
section 27, which allows the officer to search any ship or
vessel without a warrant). Other examples of acts that
require warrants to search premises are: An Act to Regulate
the Disposition of the Proceeds of Fines, Penalties, and
Forfeitures Incurred under Laws Relating to the Customs and
for other Purposes (14 Stat. 546), An Act to Amend Section
Three-thousand and Sixty-six of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, in Relation to the Authority of Search
Warrants (22 Stat. 49), the Act of 20 February 1865 (13
Stat. 441, Sec. 3), and the Act of 10 February 1891 (26
Stat. 742, Sec. 5).

is

particularly

jurisprudence.

true

in

the

Court’s

Fourth

Amendment

The Court has strengthened the protections

of criminal suspects, for example, disallowing warrantless
searches based on probable cause in public areas (roadways,
sidewalks, etc.) although such searches took place at the
time of the Founding.53 At the same time, the Court allows
the government a to obtain a warrant to search commercial
property

(and

sometimes

homes)

without

demonstrating

probable cause probable cause although the Fourth Amendment
clearly
53

requires

a

warrant.54

Edmond

continues

this

See United States v. Chadwick (433 U. S. 1, 1977),
United States v. Ross (456 U. S. 798, 1948), Arkansas v.
Sanders (442 U. S. 616, 1979), California v. Acevedo (111
S. Ct. 1982, 1991). (One might argue that after Acevedo
searches of vehicles on public roads is returned to the
original standard by permitting warrantless searches based
on probable cause. This is true but I note Justice
Scalia’s comment in his concurring opinion:
I agree with the dissent that it is
anomalous for a briefcase to be protected
By the “general requirement” of a prior
warrant when it is being carried along the
street, but for that same briefcase to
become unprotected as soon as it is carried
into an automobile. On the other hand, I
agree with the Court that it would be
anomalous for a locked compartment in an
automobile to be unprotected by the “general
requirement” of a prior warrant, but for an
unlocked briefcase within the automobile to
be protected. I join in the judgement of
the Court because I think its holding is
more faithful to the text and tradition of
the Fourth Amendment, and if these anomalies
in our jurisprudence are ever to be
eliminated that is the direction in which we
should travel. (Acevedo, 1992)
54
Text of warrant clause; For representative cases see:
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. (426 U. S. 307, 1978), Donovan

tendency.

Indeed,

in

Edmond

the

Court

cites

Camera

v.

Municipal Court55 (which allowed a suspicionless inspection
of

a

home,

suspicionless

and

Burger

search

v.

of

New
a

York56

(which

junkyard).

allowed

After

a

Edmond,

suspicionless stops of vehicles will be permissible where
the primary purpose of the search is not criminal, while
stops of vehicles of criminal suspects, must be based on
probable cause. In other words, it is permissible to harass
and inconvenience presumably law-abiding citizens with car
stops, but if the stop concerns a criminal matter, then
suspicion is required.

Criminal suspects are awarded more

protection than law-abiding citizens.

v. Dewey (452 U. S. 594, 1981), Colonnade v. United States
(397 U. S. 72, 1970), United States v. Bislow (406 U. S.
31, 1972).
55
387 U. S. 523 (1967).
56
New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987).

